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NOTES
Hospice: The Legal Ramifications of a Place to Die
The word "hospice," which means a home for the sick,' is the name given
a recent development in the area of health care and treatment for the
terminally ill. Unlike hospital care which focuses on curing the patient,
hospice care is palliative; it seeks to alleviate the patient's symptoms
rather than cure the disease or prolong the patient's life.2 Pain and misery
often face dying patients and hospice care concentrates not only on eas-
ing patients' physical discomfort but also on providing support for the
psychological, social and spiritual needs of patients and their families, so
that they "may be free to attain a degree of mental and spiritual prepara-
tion for death that is satisfactory to them."' Serious legal issues are raised
by the unorthodox approach to patient care typical of hospice treatment.
This note examines the potential tort or criminal liability of the hospice
care provider, the effect of natural death acts and living wills on the
hospice care provider's liability, and the patient's right to refuse curative
treatment and receive palliative care in a hospice. Natural death acts pro-
vide more uncertainty than protection for the hospice and, while some
recent case law favors allowing patients to refuse curative treatment,
hospices remain in a legally tenuous position. The note outlines recom-
mendations for admission and treatment procedures designed to alleviate
any potential legal liability of the hospice and staff, and it suggests that
present legislation be amended in order to protect hospice care providers.
THE HOSPICE
The concept of the hospice is an ancient one; Fabiola, a disciple of Saint
Jerome, established one in the port of Rome nearly 2,000 years ago.4 Since
that time the concept of establishing a center which provides hospitality,
refreshment and fellowship to the sick and the needy has existed
throughout Europe.' The modern hospice movement began in Great
Britain6 with the establishment of Saint Joseph's Hospice and Saint
See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1957).
2 See Potter, A Challenge for the Hospice Movement, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 53, 53 (1980).
National Hospice Organization, Standards of a Hospice Program of Care 3 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Standards].
S. STODDARD, THE HOSPICE MOVEMENT 7-8 (1978).
See id.
S. LACK & R. BUCKINGHAM, FIRST AMERICAN HOSPICE 9 (1978).
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Christopher's Hospice.' The first American hospice was the Hospice at
New Haven, Connecticut,8 and now it is estimated that between 700 and
1,000 hospice programs exist throughout the United States in various
stages of development.'
A hospice may be located in a designated wing or unit of a hospital,
or in a separate facility. In addition, some hospices operate exclusively
through home visits by the hospice staff."0 Hospice care is provided by
an interdisciplinary team which generally includes doctors, pharmacists,
nurses, social workers, clergy and volunteers." A humanistic approach
characterizes the hospice philosophy, which requires that members of the
hospice staff direct their professional training toward the special needs
of the terminally ill."
Hospice care providers distinguish between "ordinary" and "extraor-
dinary" treatment. Ordinary treatment includes "all medicines, treatments,
and operations which offer a reasonable hope of benefit, and which can
be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other
inconvenience."" Extraordinary treatment consists of "medicine, opera-
tions, or other treatment which cannot be obtained and employed without
considerable expense, pain or other inconvenience, and which provide no
reasonable hope of lasting benefit to the patient."" A hospice provides
ordinary treatment but will not administer extraordinary care; it will not
make heroic efforts to prolong the patient's life.
The ordinary care provided by a hospice is largely concerned with eas-
ing the pain which accompanies many terminal illnesses, particularly
cancer. To alleviate or control such pain, hospice care providers administer
analgesics as a prophylactic measure according to a schedule, rather than
on demand after pain occurs."' After the patient's pain is under continuous
7Id.
' Id. at 3.
' Telephone interview with Margaret Duncan, Public Information Officer for the Na-
tional Hospice Organization, McLean, Virginia (April 8, 1981).
,0 See generally S. LACK & R. BUCKINGHAM. supra note 6.
" Id. at 4, 25.
" See id. at 4.
" Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1209 (1973).
" Note, Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 148,149 (1976).
S These analgesics are frequently referred to as "Brompton's Mixture." Jaffe & Mar-
tin, Opoid Analgesics and Antagonists, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 494,
512 (6th ed. A. Gilman, L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds. 1980).
Regular administration of narcotics does not imply repetitive overdosage of the patient.
Instead, drug dosage can be titrated or adjusted to establish the minimal dosage level at
which the patient is freed from pain. "Such titration produces the optimal clinical result-
a patient who is free from pain but who is also alert enough to enjoy the benefits of pain-
free survival." Potter, supra note 2, at 54. In Britain heroin is an analgesic alternative to
morphine for the relief of intractable pain. See Shapiro, The Right of Privacy and Heroin
Use for Painkilling Purposes by the Terminally Ill Cancer Patient, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 41, 43
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control, the hospice staff turns its attention "to the psychological, social
and spiritual needs of the patient."1" A hospice
offers a carefully designed regimen of "loving care" based in an en-
vironment sensitively attuned to recognizing the needs and even the
"rights" of the dying. It addresses these needs and rights with a car-
ing regimen of pain relief, personal and family counselling, attractive
surroundings and sees to all those things which will put the patient
in charge of his own dying as much as possible. 7
Furthermore, many hospices counsel and train the patient's family to help
care for the patient while he lives and send a bereavement team to the
family's home after the patient dies. 8
No standard procedures are required for admitting patients or running
a hospice facility. 9 Since each hospice sets up its own procedures accord-
ing to its particular needs, a variety of admission requirements has been
imposed. Presumably, hospices will only admit patients who have been
diagnosed as terminally ill and have a limited life expectancy;"° a prognosis
of six months or less is common. Some hospices limit admission to patients
who are suffering from cancer.2' Others require that the patient live within
(1979). Research conducted in St. Christopher's Hospice in London has shown that in ad-
vanced cases of pain, when injections of medication rather than oral dosages are necessary,
"heroin possessels] important advantages over morphine, especially where large doses [arel
required." Id. at 44. Such studies have provoked the view that the scheme of state and
federal law in the United States which prohibits the use of heroin as an analgesic" 'sweep[s]
unnecessarily broadly,'" id. at 58 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)),
and "might well constitute an abridgement of the right of privacy," Shapiro, supra, at 42.
6 Holden, Pain, Dying and the Health Care System, 203 ScI. 984, 985 (1979). In the past
10 years chronic pain has been recognized as a disease in itself, "a debilitating condition
generally accompanied by serious psychological problems and often caused by them." Id.
at 984. Many hospice patients suffer from cancer and endure a special variety of pain: "[T]he
imminence of death, the sense of isolation, the fear of worse things to come, and the distress
of family members can make the pain far more agonizing than it would be otherwise." Id.
at 985.
17 P. ROSSMAN, HosPIcE 7 (1977). The persons who receive hospice treatment are not all
elderly; a large percentage of the people receiving care in hospices are under 50 years old
and many terminally ill children receive hospice care as well. Id. at 16. Because the cost
of the intense personal attention received in a hospice offsets the money saved by not utilizing
the high technology curative therapies offered in hospitals, the cost of inpatient hospice
care is often at least as expensive as inpatient hospital care, Supporting Hospice Care, 207
Sci. 160,160 (1980). However, patients who are able to receive home hospice care save money
since the hospice care enables them to live out their final days at home rather than in an
institution. Id. At present, health insurance such as Medicare and Medicaid does not cover
hospice care. Id. However, a two-year demonstration project in which patients in certain
hospices will have all of their expenses paid by Medicare and Medicaid was begun during
the spring of 1980. Id.
" S. LACK & R. BUCKINGHAM. supra note 6, at 76-78, 97-99.
II Telephone interview with Margaret Duncan, supra note 9. The National Hospice
Organization has outlined standards and principles to be used as guidelines for those set-
ting up a hospice, however. See Standards, supra note 3.
See generally S. LACK & R. BUCKINGHAM. supra note 6, at 75.
21 See id.
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a particular area, obtain consent and cooperation from his personal physi-
cian, obtain consent from his family and designate a friend or family
member who will serve as primary care person.' Hospices may require
the patient to sign a form stating that he consents to admission to the
hospice and agrees to palliative rather than curative treatment.'
LIABILITY OF THE HOSPICE CARE PROVIDER
Before one can evaluate and discuss advisable admission and treatment
procedures, one must discuss the legal liability involved in administering
hospice care. Because hospice care could be viewed as a form of passive
euthanasia, the hospice management and physician may be subject to civil
and criminal liability. Malpractice actions based on the claims that extraor-
dinary treatment could have saved the hospice patient and that the failure
of the hospice care provider to administer such treatment constitutes a
form of euthanasia could be instigated by the patient himself while he
is still living or by an unhappy family member after the patient's death. 4
Theoretically, a tort action could also be brought against the hospice facil-
ity itself under a theory of respondeat superior since the hospice physi-
cians may be employees under the control of the hospice. 5 In addition,
the hospice physician could face a criminal prosecution for homicide."
See id.
See generally id. at 76.
24 Hospice care providers may also face the problem of negligence for misdiagnosis.
Diagnosing a patient as terminally ill may be an uncertain matter; doctors may disagree
as to whether a patient is terminally ill. For a discussion of this matter, see note 81 infra.
Misdiagnosis in this case is extremely serious since the resulting negative effects of inap-
propriate treatment may be irreversible.
' See generally Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957);
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 305 (1960). In fact, it has been argued that a hospital could be held
independently liable, in addition to its liability under agency law. See Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Ill. 2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). Under this theory, a hospice could be sued for its failure to adequately
supervise the use of its facility by nurses, doctors and other health care professionals. It
should be noted that in some cases, charitable or state immunity might protect the hospice
if it is connected with a facility that is so protected, see generally W. WADLINGTON, LAW
AND MEDICINE 203-52 (1979).
Whether the hospice facility itself could be sued is an important consideration given the
nature of hospice care itself. The hospice could be perceived by some as a place which not
only condones but actively promotes euthanasia and it could therefore become an object
of scorn from those who view euthanasia as evil or immoral.
Some groups such as the California Pro-Life Council view granting a person the right
to die as a step toward eliminating the useless and infirm. Marian Banducci, a represen-
tative of the Friends of Mothers and Babies and the Helpless Aged, contended that "the
real target is to get rid of the people who cost too much to keep alive." Courier-J. (Louisville),
Jan. 15, 1978, § G, at 10, col. 3.
26 Though unlikely, it is nevertheless possible that a criminal action could be brought
against the hospice facility for aiding and abetting a murder.
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Physicians' and policymakers s recognize two types of euthanasia:
passive and active. Passive euthanasia results from the failure to take af-
firmative life-prolonging measures.' Active euthanasia requires an affirm-
ative act resulting in the patient's death,3 ' such as injecting a patient with
a lethal drug.3' Hospice care could be viewed as a form of passive
euthanasia since doctors using palliative treatment, by definition, take no
affirmative measures to save or prolong the patient's life. However,
hospice care could not be characterized as active euthanasia since it does
not seek to prematurely end the patient's life.32
Tort Liability
A patient could sue the hospice care provider in tort under two separate
theories: the first approach is a malpractice action based on negligent
treatment; the second is based on the doctor's failure to obtain the pa-
tient's informed consent to the treatment. The issue of negligent treat-
ment must be discussed first because if the treatment-in this case term-
inating all life-prolonging or curative therapy and providing only palliative
care-is found to be negligent, the question of informed consent does not
arise. A patient ordinarily cannot consent to negligent treatment.3 If the
treatment is found to be negligent, a court is likely to conclude that due
to some policy consideration such as the differential status or bargaining
positions of the physician and his patient,' the patient's consent to the
' Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 N. ENG. J. MED. 78, 78 (1975).
28 "Mercy killing" (active euthanasia) is specifically distinguished in seven natural death
acts. See ALA. CODE S 22-8A-10 (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West Supp. 1981);
KANS. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,109 (1980); NEv. REV. STAT. S 449.670 (1979); OP REV. STAT. 5 97.085(1)
(1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h S 10 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.122.100 (West Supp. 1981).
29 Note, supra note 14, at 148. Turning off a respirator switch is also considered passive
euthanasia, but one could argue that only a semantic distinction exists between this and
active euthanasia. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1650
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Informed Consent].
10 Note, supra note 14, at 148.
1, See Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1650.
2 See Standards, supra note 3, at 3. At least one physician argues that the distinction
between passive and active euthanasia is not a logical or even an ethical distinction and
that active euthanasia may be more humane than passive euthanasia in some cases. See
Rachels, supra note 27. However, with regard to the hospice care provider, this distinction
is important. Public policy is generally more favorably disposed to passive rather than ac-
tive euthanasia. See notes 25 & 28 supra.
See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (exculpatory provision found in agreement signed by patient did not render hospital
immune from liability on basis of wrongful acts or omissions of its employees); Olson v.
Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) (exculpatory agreement signed by patient did not render
doctor immune from liability based on negligence in performing abortion).
I See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 99-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431-32 (Tenn. 1977).
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treatment is void as against public policy and will not absolve the physi-
cian's negligence in providing the unacceptable treatment. In cases involv-
ing the discontinuation of life-prolonging treatment at the request of a
terminally ill patient, the standard of care to be applied should evaluate
whether the physician used that reasonable degree of care and skill which
physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the treatment of their
patients."5 Recent studies along with other evidence indicate that a
substantial percentage of physicians are inclined to discontinue life-
prolonging treatment for their terminally ill patients. 8 In fact, courts have
been willing to order the discontinuation of treatment in cases brought
by the patient's guardian where the patient is terminally ill and
incompetent." Therefore, a court could find evidence to support the con-
tention that discontinuing life-prolonging treatment for terminally ill pa-
tients constitutes reasonable care under the circumstances.
3 1
'5 See Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 534, 276 A.2d 36, 46 (1971); Anderson v. Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 260 Md. 348, 350, 272 A.2d 372, 373 (1971); Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 380-81,
35 A. 1094, 1096 (1896); Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 171, 16 A. 382, 384 (1889). If
the hospice care provider holds himself out as a specialist, such as an oncologist, he is held
to a higher standard of knowledge and skill than a general practitioner: the standard of
care required of physicians in the same speciality practiced by the defendant physician.
Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 403, 499 P.2d 156, 159 (1972); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354
Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968). Some courts have applied the "respectable minor-
ity" standard. See, e.g., Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967). Under a similar
standard, a physician will not be held liable for negligent treatment "[wIhere competent
medical authority is divided . . . [and] he followed the course of treatment advocated by
a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community."
McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 400 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
11 See D. CRANE. THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 40-46 (1975); Cantor, Law and the Termina-
tion of an Incompetent Patient's Life-Preserving Care, in DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 69,70 (J.
Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975).
' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
It is possible, however, that a court would be reluctant to find that, as a general rule,
discontinuing life-prolonging treatment for terminally ill patients constitutes reasonable care.
A court might fear that such a decision would be against public opinion. See the discussion
of sentiment against euthanasia, note 25 supra. If the court refuses to acknowledge that
discontinuing life-prolonging treatment is reasonable care ordinarily exercised by physi-
cians, one could argue in the alternative that even if most physicians do not practice passive
euthanasia in the case of terminally ill patients, discontinuing extraordinary treatment is
the only appropriate treatment for terminally ill patients who request it and therefore such
treatment should be the standard of care in this area. In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), the court found that administering a particular eye test was not
the standard of care ordinarily practiced by doctors in defendant's speciality, id. at 518,
519 P.2d at 982, but nevertheless applied an objective evaluation to conclude that applying
the test should be the standard of care, regardless of whether it was ordinarily administered
by physicians in defendant's speciality. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983. Finally, it is possible
that a court would be unwilling to hold that discontinuing life-prolonging treatment is ever
nonnegligent care for the reason that such a decision might be construed as dangerous in
that it is one step toward the legalization of mercy killing. See the discussion of sentiment
against euthanasia, note 25 supra. In such a case, one could argue that while it is generally
negligent to discontinue such treatment, an exception should be made in the case of hospices.
[Vol. 56:673
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If a court does find that this treatment constitutes reasonable care, it
may then consider the issue of whether the patient made an informed con-
sent to the treatment. 9 If a doctor performs treatment without the in-
formed consent of the patient, he may be found liable for not having first
obtained this consent before treating the patient-even if the treatment
is successful."0 Treatment administered without the consent of the patient
is "viewed as an intentional interference with the person-a battery."'"
When a doctor performs a medical procedure without any consent what-
soever, many courts allow battery as the theory of recovery.42 However,
when a "patient consents to a treatment but an undisclosed risk
materializes, courts have been reluctant to find that the physician has com-
mitted an intentional tort."43 Instead, courts will find that the physician
failed to exercise due care in advising his patient regarding the risks of
and alternatives to the treatment.44 A standard of due care corresponds
better doctrinally with a theory of negligence than with the theory of
battery' s and the trend has been to view malpractice in this area as a tort
of negligence rather than one of battery. 6
Irrespective of the doctrinal foundation of the informed consent con-
cept, the doctor is absolved from liability for administering a particular
treatment if he obtains an informed consent from the patient before he
administers the treatment and performs the consented-to treatment
nonnegligently."7 In order for the doctor to obtain an informed consent
from his patient he must first give the patient all material information
regarding the risks involved in the treatment" and then obtain the pa-
tient's consent to the treatment.9 The principle of informed consent is
Hospices promote a valuable public policy in providing patient autonomy and the possibil-
ity of death with dignity for terminally ill patients, while also protecting the interests of
the patients. Therefore, while consent is ordinarily not a defense to administering negligent
treatment, theories such as contributory negligence and assumption of an unreasonable risk
could be asserted as defenses against patients who have consented to the termination of
extraordinary treatment in a hospice. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 991-92,
95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 402 (1971) (patient who used drug despite knowledge from previous ex-
perience that it caused thrombophlebitis assumed risk of adverse reaction).
I Medical malpractice cases in which patients received treatments to which they had
not consented gave rise to the doctrine of informed consent. Informed Consent, supra note
29, at 1635-36.
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
4 Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1635.
42 Id. at 1636.
43 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
46 Id.
4: See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 101, 162 (1971).
46 The court in Wilkinson v. Vesy, 110 R.I. 606, 627-28, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972), defined
"material" as all facts which a reasonable man would regard as significant in light of "the
severity of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence." Id. at 628, 295 A.2d at 689. The
more severe or likely the risk, the more probable it is to be material. Id.
'" Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1636; Survey, supra note 13, at 1222.
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based on the premise that the patient "know[s] best his own value
preferences, capacity for pain and suffering, and uncompleted business
and social obligations," 0 and is therefore in a better position than the doc-
tor to decide whether to undergo the treatment. This reasoning applies
to the terminally ill patient as well as the curable patient,5' even though
the risks and alternatives that must be disclosed to the terminally ill pa-
tient are different from those disclosed to the curable patient. For exam-
ple, compared with the curable patient, the terminally ill patient may not
be as concerned with the risk of death involved in a certain medical pro-
cedure, since death is inevitable for the terminal patient. Instead, he may
be more concerned with the discomfort involved in a particular treatment
and the probability that the treatment would significantly prolong his life.
Nevertheless, the terminally ill patient's decision in choosing one treat-
ment over another is logically no different from that of a curable patient;'
the terminally ill patient is still in the best position to determine his own
preferences and capacity to endure pain and suffering.53 Therefore, the
principle of informed consent is no less applicable for the terminally ill
patient than for the curable patient.
This principle of informed consent implies that the patient also has a
right to an informed refusal. 4 The patient is only in a position to exercise
an informed consent to one treatment if, after having been informed of
the risks and alternatives involved with that treatment, he can refuse the
treatment should he feel the risks are too great or that an alternative
treatment is preferable. If the patient cannot refuse treatment, his choice
with regard to an informed consent to that treatment is meaningless.
Therefore, a doctor may be found liable for failing to obtain an informed
consent or an informed refusal-even if the treatment performed was ap-
propriate, was performed nonnegligently and the patient benefited from
the treatment.5
Furthermore, the estate of the hospice patient might bring an action
under a "survival act"56 on the basis that the actions of malpractice for
Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1648.
Id. at 1649.
5 Id.
See id.
' Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integ-
rity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973).
' In fact, correspondence with various hospice facilities indicates that many hospices
do not require incoming patients to sign any agreement specifying that they consent to
palliative care. Letters from Parkview Memorial Hospital, Horizon Hospice and Highland
Park Hospice in response to a survey dated March 27, 1980 (letters on file with the In-
diana Law Journal).
' Every state has some sort of statutory remedy which either arises independently at
the patient's death, such as a wrongful death act, or preserves the cause of action vested
in the deceased patient, such as a survival act. W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 902.
Beneficiaries of the action are often specifically designated by the respective statute in ac-
[Vol. 56:673
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discontinuing life-prolonging treatment or lack of informed consent which
could have been brought by the patient are preserved for the patient's
descendants. Alternatively, the estate of the hospice patient might pur-
sue a statutory remedy for wrongful death 7 which arises as a separate
cause of action upon the death of the patient. Both the survival and the
wrongful death acts typically provide that an action can be brought for
"any wrongful act, neglect or default" which causes death,5 so the estate
could sue pursuant to a negligent as well as an intentional tort.59 In fact,
an action for wrongful death based on the doctor's liability under the
criminal law could also be brought since any act which constitutes criminal
conduct would ordinarily constitute "wrongful" conduct under a wrongful
death theory.
Criminal Liability
Criminal liability is unclear in the area of discontinuing treatment for
a terminally ill patient, and it is possible that a hospice physician could
find himself facing criminal prosecution. Euthanasia is viewed as a clear
violation of criminal law"0 such that even those practicing passive
euthanasia theoretically could be prosecuted for murder." Moreover, the
doctrine of informed consent provides no defense for the defendant physi-
cian because a victim's consent is no defense to the crime of murder.2
cordance with the purpose underlying such a statute-which is to compensate family
members who perhaps had expectations of continuing support from the deceased if he had
lived. Id. at 904. Under the survival acts, damages recoverable for the patient's death "will
include not only the pain and suffering, medical expenses and loss of earnings of the dece-
dent during his lifetime, but further compensation to the estate itself for loss of prospec-
tive economic benefit in the form of future earnings or savings." Id. at 905. Under a wrongful
death act, however, the beneficiaries of the estate may recover only "the loss of economic
benefit which they might have expected to receive from the decedent in the form of sup-
port, services or contributions during the remainder of his lifetime" had he lived. Id. at
906. Because recovery is ordinarily limited to pecuniary benefits, courts have not adopted
the notion that no human life is without value. Id. at 907. Therefore, in the case of the ter-
minally ill hospice patient who would not have been able to render any sort of economic
benefit upon his family had he not died (in fact, he is likely to be costing his family great
expense), his beneficiaries would be able to recover little.
-1 See id. at 903.
58 Id.
59 Id.
Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30
RUTGER L. REV. 304, 309 (1977). "Thus one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward
his victim and believes his act is morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if
he is able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief."
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966). Murder
is defined as "the killing of another human being with malice aforethought." Survey, supra
note 13, at 1204. Motive for the killing is irrelevant since malice is now defined as intent
to kill or cause serious bodily harm. Id.
81 See generally Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 671, 108 S.W. 1139, 1141 (1908).
Survey, supra note 13, at 1205.
1981]
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In fact, all of the special factors which "arguably distinguish euthanasia
from more reprehensible forms of killing- a humanitarian motive, the con-
sent of the victim, and the victim's hopeless condition"-are irrelevant
under the criminal law.8
Although evidence indicates that the practice is widespread,' there have
been few instances of criminal convictions for euthanasia. 5 Even where
prosecution has been undertaken, both judges and juries hesitate to be
too harsh on defendants.6 Nevertheless, hospice care providers by no
means are immune from prosecution under criminal law. Homicide may
result from a failure to act as well as from positive action. 7 A person is
liable for a failure to act when a clear duty to act was present,68 so that
a physician is liable for failing to provide life-prolonging treatment only
when his relationship with his patient imposes a duty on him to continue
treatment.
This relationship between physician and patient may be construed as
contractual in that the patient seeks services from the doctor and the doc-
tor is free to accept or refuse the patient's offer of employment. 9 However,
6 Id.
" Id. at 1213.
6S Id.
Id. In fact, recent case law regards death following euthanasia as "expiration from
existing natural causes," and not as criminal homicide. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51,
355 A.2d 647, 670, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Furthermore, the court in Quinlan stated
that if such a death were considered a homicide, it would not be an unlawful homicide, since
the right of privacy allows treatment to be terminated in certain cases, so that any resulting
death would not come within the scope of criminal homicide statutes. This is because the
termination of treatment pursuant to the constitutionally protected right of privacy would
be a lawful activity and such an exercise of a constitutional right is protected from criminal
prosecution. Id. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 670. The court stated that the state's power to punish
the taking of human life "does not encompass individuals terminating medical treatment
pursuant to their right of privacy." Id. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670. The court added: "There
is a real and in this case determinative distinction between the unlawful taking of the life
of another and the ending of artificial life-support systems as a matter of self-determination."
Id. In fact, one could argue that interpretation of a homicide statute to encompass passive
euthanasia is an unconstitutional interpretation of the statute since it deprives an individual
of his constitutionally protected right of privacy in deciding whether to refuse medical treat-
ment. See notes 108-70 & accompanying text infra.
There is a standing problem here since the person prosecuted under the homicide statute
is the physician and the person who has the right of privacy to refuse medical treatment
is the patient. However, holding the physician liable for murder clearly has a "chilling ef-
fect" on the patient's exercise of his constitutional right. The physician is in charge of carry-
ing out the patient's decision to refuse or accept treatment, and because of his possible
liability may be unwilling to act in accordance with the patient's decision.
' People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 211, 113 N.W. 1128, 1130 (1907).
" See id.
69 Survey, supra note 13, at 1207. Of course, if the physician is discharged or withdraws
with proper notice to the patient, the contractual relationship ends and the physician is
thereafter not liable should life-prolonging treatment be discontinued. Nevertheless, a physi-
cian may not terminate the relationship by abandoning his patient. Murray v. United States,
329 F.2d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 1964); Vann v. Harden, 187 Va. 555, 565, 47 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1948).
Criminal liability arises where the physician-patient relationship still exists, not having been
terminated by discharge or withdrawal with sufficient notice. Survey, supra note 13, at 1208.
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once the patient-physician relationship commences, the physician has a
contractual duty to provide treatment "so long as the case requires."70
This duty requires the physician to exercise some judgment and take
reasonable steps in terminating the relationship.7 On the basis of this duty,
many commentators conclude that criminal liability may be imposed "on
a physician who fails to take all action necessary to prolong the life of
a dying patient."72
The confusion in the area of a physician's criminal liability for discon-
tinuing life-prolonging treatment lies in the definition of the duty that ex-
ists between the physician and his patient. Certainly, if the physician's
act of discontinuing treatment were found to be acceptable as falling under
the standard of due care for terminally ill patients under certain cir-
cumstances, and therefore found to be nonnegligent treatment, the
criminal law would not impose a duty on the doctor to continue life-
prolonging treatment under all circumstances. However, thus far it is not
clear that providing treatment "so long as the case requires" gives the
physician the discretion to terminate treatment when he has determined
that further life-prolonging treatment will render no lasting benefit.
Therefore, the patient-physician relationship in the hospice context could
conceivably render hospice care providers criminally liable for omitting
to provide life-prolonging treatment to their patients. It has been argued,
however, that the duty to treat a terminal patient "so long as the case
requires" will be interpreted by the courts as meaning "until the patient's
condition becomes hopeless,""3 instead of "until death finally occurs."'74 Such
an interpretation would absolve hospice care providers from liability for
terminating life-prolonging treatment for their patients found to be ter-
minally ill. However, hospice care providers cannot be certain that courts
will apply this more flexible interpretation. While public opinion seems
to be moving in the direction of allowing physicians to discontinue treat-
ment for their terminally ill patients who request it, as the criminal law
presently stands, hospice care providers still face the possibility of being
prosecuted for homicide.
THE EFFECT OF LIVING WILLS AND NATURAL DEATH ACTS
Fearing subsequent civil or criminal liability, physicians may be reluc-
tant to comply with their patients' requests to terminate life-prolonging
treatment. 5 In response to this reluctance, many people have drafted liv-
ing wills to prevent being kept alive in a state of incapacitation and misery.
11 Survey, supra note 13, at 1208.
1 See generally id. at 1207-08.
7 Id. at 1207.
7 Id. at 1208.
7' Id.
71 See Kutner, The Living Will: Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 39, 46 (1975).
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The living will is a directive written by a patient to his physician
stipulating that it is the patient's wish that the physician refrain from
administering life-prolonging treatment should the patient become ter-
minally ill."8 Drafting such a document has been viewed as "a contribu-
tion to the responsibility a thinking individual owes to himself to rationally
approach death without terror or anxiety anticipating the event when his
life processes may be, and are, irreversibly disabled."" A living will is
unenforceable absent enabling legislation and to insure that such direc-
tives can be enforced eleven states have enacted natural death acts thus
far."8 These statutes are designed to increase patients' legal control of
treatment decisions and eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the legality
of complying with a terminally ill patient's wish that treatment be
stopped."9 These statutes permit hospices to cease life-prolonging treat-
ment and administer palliative care when they act pursuant to a patient's
valid directive. Each of the eleven statutes provides that neither the physi-
cian nor the medical facility is criminally or civilly liable for complying
with a patient's directive to terminate life-prolonging treatment.'
A directive must meet various requirements to be valid under the acts.
Although the language of the statutes is unclear, in four states the terms
of the statutes require that the patient be terminally ill at the time of
execution.8" Hospices are intended to provide health care to terminally
ill patients. However, these four acts protect the hospice care provider
7" See id. at 47.
" Id. at 39.
11 ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-3801 to -3804 (West Supp. 1977);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE SS 39-4501 to -4508
(West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. SS 65-28,101 to ,109 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 55 449.540-.690
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 24-7-1 to -11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1981); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1979); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, SS 1-11 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 70.122.010-.905 (West Supp. 1981). As of Spring 1981,
the District of Columbia and 19 states are considering natural death bills: Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Vermont. Society for the Right to Die Newsletter, Spring 1981.
"' See ALA. CODE 5 22-8A-2 (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.010 (West Supp. 1981).
10 ALA. CODE 5 22-8A-7 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 82-3804 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE 57190 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 394507 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN. S 65-28,106 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.630 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 24-7-7 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. S 90-321(h) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.065(2) (1979); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.050 (West Supp. 1981).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7187(e), 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE SS 39-4503(3),
39-4504(2) (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050(5), 97.055(1) (1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h, SS 2(5), 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Only six states require written certifica-
tion that the patient is terminally ill before life-prolonging treatment may be legally discon-
tinued: ALA. CODE § 22-8A-6 (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 7187(e) (West Supp. 1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 65-28, 102(e) (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 24-7-5(A) (1978); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h, 5 2(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 70.122.020(6) (West
Supp. 1980). Unless the certification is in writing, evidentiary problems could arise in a
hospice setting should a relative of a patient later challenge the admission of the patient
to a hospice facility. However, many hospices require no written certification that the pa-
tient has been diagnosed as terminally ill. Letters from Hazel E. Etzler, Hospice Nurse
Coordinator of Parkview Memorial Hospital and T. Margaret Difrancesca of Highland Park
HOSPICE
only if the patient was terminally ill at the time he executed the direc-
tive. Therefore, the hospice is not protected under these acts with regard
to patients who executed a directive before they became terminally ill,
even if they are terminally ill at the time they enter the hospice.82
Another requirement common to eight of the natural death acts is that
the patient be an adult at the time he executes a directive.' Only two
acts outline procedures whereby designated persons may execute a direc-
tive on behalf of a minor.' Thus, the acts that stipulate that a valid direc-
tive may only be executed by an adult will not protect a hospice with
regard to minors receiving palliative care. A similar problem arises under
five of the acts which stipulate that a valid directive may not be executed
by a pregnant woman where her physician has knowledge of the
pregnancy.' Hospices located in these states are likewise not protected
under the acts with regard to their patients who are pregnant."
Hospice, and unsigned response from Horizon Hospice in response to a survey dated March
27, 1980 (letters on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
It should be noted that the definition of a "terminal" condition is not at all clear. Pa-
tients who have been termed incurable by one physician may be considered treatable with
the expectation of cure or prolonged palliation by another physician. "[Platients with ex-
tensive cancer of the cervix with local involvement in the pelvis have been termed incurable
when actually, by means of aggressive surgical procedures such as exenteration, they may
have prolonged periods of palliation and a certain number may be cured." Potter, supra
note 2, at 53. Furthermore, there is also the problem of determining what length of prog-
nosis will qualify as terminal. Seven states use the word "imminent" in determining whether
the patient qualifies as one who may draft a valid directive: ALA. CODE S 22-8A-3(6) (1981);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7187(c), 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 39-4503,39-4504
(West Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.610 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055(1) (1979; TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, SS 2(3), 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5
70.122.020(4), 70.122.030(1}(a) (West Supp. 1981). None of these states, however, define "im-
minent." The National Hospice Organization states that hospice care is oriented toward
persons with a prognosis of six months or less. Standards, supra note 3, at 11. The problem
of determining when a patient is terminal may be a serious flaw in the natural death act
procedure since the statutes cannot be applied with certainty in all cases.
' The four states with statutes which require that the patient be terminally ill at the
time he executes a directive do not cover situations where the patient is comatose as a
result of an injury or sudden illness, even if the patient is terminally ill and would wish
to discontinue treatment. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7187(e), 7188 (West Supp. 1981);
IDAHO CODE S§ 39-4503(3), 39-4504(2) (West Supp. 1978); Oa. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050(5), 97.055(1)
(1979); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, SS 2(5), 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
8 ALA. CODE S 22-8A-4(a) (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7188 (West Supp. 1981);
IDAHO CODE S 39-4503(3) (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a) (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. S 449.600 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050(5) (1979); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h,
S 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
" ARK. STAT. ANN. S 82-3803 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (1978). North
Carolina is silent with regard to whether one must be an adult in order to execute a valid
directive. It could be argued that in those states that fail to provide a procedure whereby
life-prolonging treatment may be terminated for minors, the legislature did not intend for
minors to receive palliative care. This interpretation would have serious implications for
hospices which admit minor patients.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,103 (1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, S 3 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
8 In the states which prohibit pregnant women from drafting valid directives, a strong
presumption may be made that the legislature intended to prohibit pregnant women from
receiving palliative care. This interpretation puts a hospice in a precarious position if it
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Furthermore, nine acts require that the patient be competent at the
time he executes a directiveY Only one act allows designated third per-
sons to execute the directive for any patient who is "physically or men-
tally unable . . or otherwise incapacitated"' from executing the direc-
tive and another act outlines a procedure whereby designated third per-
sons may execute a valid directive for a patient who is comatose. 89
Although hospices are primarily intended for persons who are alert enough
to benefit from the various counselling services, personal care and plea-
sant surroundings which hospices provide,' a patient could be capable of
appreciating the homelike atmosphere and virtually unlimited visitation
procedures which a hospice provides while still being legally incompetent.
Given that no definition of "competent" is provided in these acts9' and
admits pregnant patients. However, it should be noted that these provisions may be found
unconstitutional, at least if the woman is in the first trimester of pregnancy. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1 Each of the directive forms reads, "I, , being of sound mind" ALA. CODE
S 22-8A-4(c) (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S
39-4504 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,103(c) (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.610
(1979); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055 (1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, S 3 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1981); accord, N.M. STAT. ANN.
S 24-7-3 (1978) (section does not contain a directive, but requires the person to be "of sound
mind" before executing a directive).
I ARK. STAT. ANN. S 82-3803 (West Supp. 1977). Many persons in Arkansas are drafting
"Right to Life" directives in fear that their family or others might cut off life-prolonging
treatment pursuant to this section. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE. 1979-1980 MANUAL 24
[hereinafter cited as SOCIETY].
Interesting problems arise when a third party is allowed to decide to end extraordinary
treatment for a terminally ill or comatose patient. For example, in Denver, Colorado, a mother
charged with felony child abuse won a temporary restraining order from the Colorado
Supreme Court preventing doctors from turning off a respirator that sustained the breathing
of her 17-month-old abused son. Rosalie Lovato, on trial for child abuse, sought to continue
the respirator because without the respirator her son might die and she could then be charged
with a more serious offense. Courier-J. (Louisville), Sept. 13, 1979, S A, at 4, col. 2.
89 N.C. GEN. STAT. S 90-322 (1981). Interestingly, those persons designated to execute the
directive on behalf of the incompetent under both the North Carolina and Arkansas acts
are just those persons who are most likely to benefit from the shortened life of the pa-
tient. For a discussion of the need for formalities to protect the patient, see note 98 infra.
Because of these provisions, Arkansas and North Carolina could be criticized for not pro-
viding enough protection for the patient. One case study describes a 76-year-old retired
man suffering from a terminal illness which rendered him incompetent. This man expressed
a strong desire to the medical staff that his life be prolonged. His family, on the other hand,
"expressed strong feelings ... that no 'heroic' measures be undertaken." Jackson & Youngner,
Patient Autonomy and "Death with Dignity," 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 404, 406 (1979). Under
the Arkansas act that patient's family could draft a directive for the patient, despite his
wish to continue living.
" "Hospice exists in the hope and belief that, through appropriate care and the promo-
tion of a caring community sensitive to their needs, patients and families may be free to
attain a degree of mental and spiritual preparation for death that is satisfactory to them."
Standards, supra note 3, at 3.
91 However, Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (West Supp. 1977), and New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3(B) (1978), require that a directive be executed with the same formalities
as is required of a valid will, which could indicate that at least in those two states a patient
must be competent enough to execute a valid will; that is, the patient must be competent
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given that under four of these acts the patient additionally must be ter-
minally ill,1 questions of what constitutes competence with regard to ex-
ecuting a valid directive could become quite acute in the hospice situation.'
As a result of their illness, terminal patients suffer both physical and
psychological symptoms that could arguably render them incompetent. 4
Along with the requirements discussed above, each statute outlines cer-
tain formalities to be followed in executing the directive95 and may pro-
vide a specific form with which the directive must comply." All eleven
of the statutes require the signatures of witnesses in addition to that of
the patient himself,' and set forth certain restrictions regarding who may
qualify as a witness." A further formality found in three of the acts is
enough to understand his business affairs and the nature of his assets and how his
distributees will be affected by them. This interpretation of competence to execute a valid
directive could be inappropriate in the living will context. Perhaps all that is necessary
is that the patient be cognizant enough to know whether he would rather live or die given
his present state of life. This would be a much lower standard than requiring that the pa-
tient be able to relate his assets to those to whom he may wish to give them. A person
who is only semiconscious due to extreme pain and large doses of medicine is likely to unders-
tand his present quality of life and what he has to look forward to while unable to explore
and uninterested in exploring his financial status and to whom he wishes his assets to be
distributed.
1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE SS 7187(e), 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 394503(3),
39-4504(2) (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. SS 97.050(5), 97.055(1) (1979); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h SS 2(5), 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
11 Competency may be defined in different ways for different purposes. See Sieling v.
Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1973) (competency to plead guilty distinguished from
competency to stand trial).
One definition of competency to consent to medical treatment was outlined by the Supreme
Court of Washington in Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967). In that
case the court found that competency is presumed; to overcome this presumption, clear,
cogent and convincing evidence is necessary. The court used the same test to determine
competency that is used to determine the capacity of an individual to execute an agree-
ment: whether the person, at the time of making the agreement, possessed sufficient reason
to understand the nature, terms and effect of the agreement. See id. at 307, 422 P.2d at
814. For a discussion of mental competency to accept medical treatment, see Informed Con-
sent, supra note 29.
"See also note 98 infra.
'5 ALA. CODE S 22-8A4(a) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE S 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 394504 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 5 65-28,103; NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.600 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 24-7-3 (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 5 90-321(c) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055 (1977); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h
S 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
IDAHO CODE S 394504 (West Supp. 1978); NEv. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 97.055 (1979); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h S 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). However,
Alabama, Kansas and Washington allow a patient to add material to the form. The declara-
tion must substantially follow the form, but may also include other specific directions. ALA.
CODE 5 22-8A-4(c) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 65-28,103(c) (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1981).
" See ALA. CODE S 22-8A-4(a) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 82-3802 (West Supp. 1977); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (West Supp. 1978);
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,103; NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.600 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 24-7-3 (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. S 90-321(c) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h S 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
" See ALA. CODE 5 22-8A-4(a) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 82-3802 (West Supp. 1977); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 39-4504 (West Supp. 1978);
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the requirement that the directive be renewed every five years.9 This
requirement raises no problems in the hospice context since the patient
could easily draft a new directive upon entering the hospice and renew
it every five years thereafter, 0 although it is unlikely that a hospice pa-
tient would live that long.
Unfortunately, while natural death acts could protect the hospice and
the hospice physician with regard to all of its patients who qualify to draft
a valid directive, under ten of the acts, a hospice may not require a pa-
tient to draft a directive as an admission requirement or condition to
receiving hospice care.10' Therefore, unless the patient independently ex-
ecutes a directive on or before entering a hospice, hospices in these ten
states have no greater protection than hospices in states which have no
natural death act. In fact, hospices have less protection in these jurisdic-
tions, since it is likely that the provisions prohibiting the execution of
directives as an admission requirement would also prohibit signatures to
informed consent forms as an admission requirement. At least in the other
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,103; NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.600 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. S 90-321(c) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
These formalities are important for the protection of the patient since the possibilities of
mistake, undue influence and even fraud are present. Beneficiaries of the patients will stand
to benefit earlier if life-prolonging treatment is terminated. Similarly, the expense and emo-
tional distress to the patient's family is ended earlier if life-prolonging treatment is ter-
minated. These reasons may color the intentions of the patient's family or other persons
who stand to benefit from the patient's timely death with regard to the influence they ex-
ert on a patient to draft a directive.
In addition, the formalities are important for the patient's protection from himself; pa-
tients are known to change their minds with regard to whether they wish to continue life-
prolonging treatment. For example, a patient in a particularly painful stage of his treat-
ment may at first wish to terminate extraordinary efforts to preserve his life, but later
change his mind when he enters into a new phase of treatment and the pain subsides. Simi-
larly, patients are known to suffer depression, ambivalence or fear of further treatment
during their illness, any of which may cause them to make a premature decision to ter-
minate extraordinary care. See generally Jackson & Youngner, supra note 89. Certainly,
the patient must be competent enough to understand the implications of the directives;
the decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment is serious and must be carefully considered
and skillfully recorded.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189(5) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 39-4506 (West
Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055(4) (1977).
"0 California and Oregon make it harder for a hospice patient to renew the directive since
they have special restrictions on who may be a witness for directive of a patient in a skill-
ed nursing facility. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.5 (West Supp. 1981); On. REV. STAT.
S 97.055(3) (1977). Eight of the acts prohibit the hospice physician or staff from being a witness
for the directive. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 7188 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE S 39-4506
(West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,103(a)(4) (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. S 449.600 (1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3)(iii) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. S 97.055 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590h S 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1981).
1*1 ALA. CODE S 22-8A-9(c) (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7192(c) (West Supp. 1981);
IDAHO S 39-4508(3) (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 65-28,108(c) (1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
S 449.650(3) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8(c) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 90-321(g) (1981); OR.
REV. STAT. 5 97.080(2) (1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h S 8(c) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.070(3) (West Supp. 1981).
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states, hospices could require signatures to such forms to be used as
evidence that at the time of admission the patient had been advised of
the implications of and alternatives to palliative care.
Furthermore, it has been argued that if the patient fails to draft a direc-
tive altogether, hospices have less protection in states which have enacted
a natural death act. °2 Given that the natural death acts outline a specific
procedure which, if followed by a physician or health care facility, pro-
tects the physician or facility from liability, the natural death acts could
be interpreted as a statement of public policy implying that unless that
specific procedure is followed, the physician or facility is vulnerable to
liability in tort or in criminal law. In other words, in eleven jurisdictions,
if the physician discontinues life-prolonging treatment without the benefit
of a patient's valid directive, he is acting outside the protection of the
natural death act and therefore may not be immune from liability.
If a court makes the assumption that the natural death act is such a
statement of public policy, then even if a patient voluntarily drafts a direc-
tive, without regard to any admission requirement, the theory of informed
consent provides no defense for the physician. When a presumption is
made that only designated persons may refuse life-prolonging treatment,
a physician may not legally discontinue treatment for those who have not
drafted valid directives, regardless of whether they consent to the treat-
ment; the statute would be interpreted as stating that terminating treat-
ment for those who either cannot or do not draft valid directives, con-
stitutes actionable conduct. This would be an unfortunate effect of the
statutes. Certainly, these eleven legislatures did not intend their natural
death acts to lessen the protection of health facilities like hospices. One
of the primary purposes of these acts is to recognize patient autonomy
in decisionmaking relating to a patient's own medical care,' 3 and the
philosophy of hospice care is dedicated to promoting just this sort of pa-
tient autonomy."
Three states anticipate this problem and include a provision stipulating
that no presumption may be made pursuant to the natural death act regar-
ding the intention of an individual who has not executed a directive to
withhold life-prolonging treatment."5 While courts in these states will not
112See Horan, The "Right to Die" Legislative and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488,
491 (1978).
1° See SociETY. supra note 88, at 5.
104
The patient and family are the raison d'etre for Hospice programs. Patient
and family participation in the decisions and care giving, to the maximum ex-
tent possible, should enable the patient and family to live according to their
"style" and with the dignity and respect due all human beings until the mo-
ment of the patient's death.
Standards, supra note 3, at 7.
105 ALA. CODE S 22-8A-9(e) (1981); IDAHO CODE S 39-4508 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.
65-28,108(e) (1980). However, North Carolina included a section in its natural death act
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make a presumption based on the failure of a person to draft a directive,
they may still interpret a statute's specific denial of the ability of a minor
or a pregnant woman to draft a valid directive as constituting a state-
ment of public policy that at least those persons have no right to refuse
treatment. Seven states include a section providing that the statute will
not impair or supersede any previously existing legal right to withhold
treatment.""8 These seven sections, although they are quite vague, could
arguably be interpreted as negating any presumption that might be made
regarding a patient who fails to draft a directive, but they still would not
prevent a court from concluding that the legislature intended to make a
public policy statement regarding those persons specifically prohibited
from refusing life-prolonging treatment. In any case, it is not clear that
a physician in fact has the legal right to withhold life-prolonging treat-
ment from his patient, absent protection granted by a natural death act."7
In many respects, the natural death acts do not provide adequate pro-
tection to hospices and hospice physicians. Not only do most of the acts
fail to protect hospices in cases where the patient is a minor or incompe-
tent, but further, they deny hospices the right to require qualified patients
to draft a directive before receiving palliative care and may prohibit
hospices from requiring informed consent forms as well. As a result of
these shortcomings in the natural death acts, hospices must choose either
to refuse to admit many patients or risk criminal and civil liability for
treating patients who have not executed valid directives. Furthermore,
if courts interpret these acts to express the legislative intention that life-
prolonging treatment may not be terminated if the patient has not ex-
ecuted a valid directive, the hospice's legal position is weaker in states
that have natural death acts than in states that have not enacted such
statutes.
BALANCING THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PRESERVING LIFE
AGAINST THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
Even though legislation has failed to provide either adequate protec-
tion for the hospice or sufficient autonomy for the patient, the common
law has long recognized that an individual has a "strong interest in being
which outlines procedures which may be taken in the absence of a directive. N.C. GEN. STAT.
S 90-322 (1981). Therefore, in North Carolina, the presumption is even stronger that the
physician is liable should he terminate life-prolonging treatment without following the pro-
cedures outlined in the natural death act.
11 ALA. CODE S 22-SA-9(d) (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7193 (West Supp. 1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. S 449.680 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-9 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 90-320 (1981);
OR. REV. STAT. S 97.085(2) (1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h S 11 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
107 See text accompanying notes 24-74 supra.
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free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity." ' 8 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the right to make medical decisions
regarding one's own body as among the personal freedoms granted to per-
sons in the United States.1"9 As Justice, then judge, Cardozo so succinctly
states in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital:10 "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body."'
1
'
Moreover, while the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right
of privacy, Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of
privacy exists in the area involving medical matters. " 2 In Griswold v.
Connecticut,"' the Supreme Court found that an unwritten right of privacy
exists in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights,"' and
interdicted state intrusion into the area of personal decisionmaking with
regard to contraception and its relation to family life."' In Roe v. Wade,"'
the Supreme Court found that the right of privacy extends to a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy and that the state's intrusion into
the area of her personal decisionmaking is significant." While the Court
11 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424 (1977).
"I See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 250 (1891).
'to 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
"I Id. at 126, 105 N.E. at 93; accord, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104
(1960). It should be noted that some philosophers argue that the state has an interest in
interfering with an individual's decisionmaking only when it is preventing that individual
from harming others. According to John Stuart Mill:
The sole end for which mankind [is] warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is [that of] self
protection .... (Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercis-
ed over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient war-
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of
others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (D. Spitz ed. 1975). Mill's serious skepticism of state paternalism ex-
tends to the point that he asserts that such intervention could impair one's humanity:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him,
has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. Were some-
one else to make fundamental decisions for him lilt is possible that he might
be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way ... [blut what will
be his comparative worth as a human being?
Id. at 56.
H2 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
,,I 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11 Id. at'484.
It Id. at 485-86; accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's decision to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions falls within right of privacy).
"1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117 Id. at 153.
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in Roe acknowledged that the right of privacy "is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests,""' 8 it also found that the
right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.""' 9 Surely, the right of privacy
is broad enough to encompass a terminally ill patient's right to refuse
treatment." As the Court in Roe suggested, one must balance the patient's
right of privacy, in this case to refuse treatment, against the state's in-
terest in preserving life.'
The right of privacy with regard to medical matters entails the right
of a patient to refuse treatment when the treatment involves a signifi-
cant bodily invasion and the circumstances of the case are such that no
state interest overrides the right of privacy. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court examined factors such as the psychological and physical harm which
could result from motherhood in addition to the stigma of unwed
motherhood in reaching the conclusion that the state's intrusion into a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is significant."2
In In re Quackenbush," the New Jersey Supreme Court found a signifi-
cant bodily invasion when a patient was in such a severely gangrenous
condition that saving his life required amputating both of his legs below
the knee. Even though the patient would have had a positive prognosis
had he undergone the amputation, the court found that the right of privacy
applied and allowed him to refuse treatment."4 Denying a terminally ill
hospice patient the option to refuse life-prolonging treatment also may
be viewed as an instance of significant bodily invasion. In compelling treat-
ment the state would be intruding into perhaps the most important area
of an individual's decisionmaking. Only the patient can know best how
long he can withstand physical and mental suffering without losing his
dignity. Moreover, the state in compelling life-prolonging treatment is
likely to be compelling additional pain and an additional financial and emo-
tional burden on the patient and his family. Surely this is a significant
and unacceptable intrusion of the state into the private decisionmaking
of an individual.
Since disallowing a terminally ill patient the decision to discontinue life-
prolonging treatment may be construed as a significant bodily invasion,
the right of privacy will apply unless the state has a compelling interest
which requires treatment. Court opinions explaining the extent of the
state's interest in interfering with a patient's decisionmaking in the area
", Id. at 154.
119 Id. at 153.
This has been argued in several state supreme court decisions. See, e.g., text accom-
panying note 143 infra.
,1' 410 U.S. at 152-55. In Roe, the Court extended the state's interest in preserving life
to preserving prenatal life as well. Id. at 150.
Id. at 153.
156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
124 Id. at 290, 383 A.2d at 789.
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of medical matters hold that the state may interfere only when it is act-
ing "'to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state
may lawfully protect.""" Four state interests usually are raised in op-
position to a patient's wish to refuse treatment: first, preserving life; sec-
ond, protecting the interests of innocent third parties; third, preventing
suicide; and fourth, maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession."6 To determine whether a patient has the constitutional right
to refuse life-prolonging treatment and submit to a hospice's palliative
treatment, each of the countervailing state interests must be examined
to determine if the interest is substantial enough to override the in-
dividual's right of privacy.
The court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston noted that
the state has an interest in preserving life where the lack of medical treat-
ment could result in death while the risk in the operation with the treat-
ment is not great." Similarly, in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson," the court denied a pregnant woman the right to
refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds. The state's interest in
the welfare of the infant justified giving the transfusion against the
mother's wishes since the transfusion would save the lives of both mother
and child.'
However, it may be argued that the state's interest in preserving life
is lessened if the patient is terminally ill. The Supreme Court in Roe found
that the state's interest in restricting a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy becomes increasingly compelling as the pregnancy
progresses. 3' It held that prior to the end of the first trimester, the deci-
sion to abort the pregnancy is free from state intervention,"' while in the
second trimester the state may regulate abortions "in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health""' and in the third trimester, the
state may regulate or proscribe abortions entirely,"' pursuant to its in-
terest in "the potentiality of human life"', represented by a: viable fetus."'
"' Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp. of Joliet, 340 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (quoting
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
".Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d
417, 425 (1977); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
"2 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
See id. at 582-83, 279 A.2d at 673.
' 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
,4 Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
410 U.S. at 162-63.
' Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
"4 Id. at 164-65. The state may not endanger the mother's health, however, in regulating
or proscribing abortions.
Id. at 164.
,' It should be noted that the Supreme Court reserved the right of the state to regulate
the abortion procedure insofar as such regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health. Id. at 163. For example, the state could require that the
person performing the abortion have certain qualifications or that the abortion be performed
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Similarly, in the case of a patient who seeks to refuse life-prolonging treat-
ment, it may be argued that the state's interest becomes increasingly com-
pelling as the possibility of preserving life becomes greater, but as the
prognosis dims this interest becomes less and less compelling. '37 Preserv-
ing life is impossible in the case of a terminally ill patient, and even if
it is argued that the state also has an interest in prolonging the life of
a patient, such an interest would not be substantial in the case of a ter-
minally ill hospice patient. A hospice patient generally has a prognosis
of six months or less,1n even if he submits to further curative therapy.
The progress of his disease is such that it is highly questionable that fur-
ther treatment offers any sort of lasting benefit. While one could argue
reasonably that the state's interest in preserving life extends also to pro-
longing life in the case of a patient for whom curative or life-prolonging
treatment is likely to provide lasting benefit, in the case of a hospice pa-
tient, compelling treatment is likely to provide only further pain and ex-
pense and is therefore unreasonable. If the state denies the patient the
right to refuse extraordinary treatment and denies the physician the
discretion to terminate such treatment where to do so is appropriate, it
is essentially forcing the patient to choose between undergoing all
available curative therapies, however painful and expensive they may be,
or dying at home in pain, without the palliative assistance which medical
science could provide.
State courts have applied the reasoning that the state's interest is less
compelling when preserving life is impossible. In Superintendent of Beicher-
town State School v. Saikewicz,"9 a Massachusetts court singled out the
state's interest in preserving life as the "most significant of the asserted
state interests" 0 and limited this interest when the patient is terminally
ill. The court found that while the state may intervene to preserve life
when the affliction is curable, "it is not inconsistent to recognize a right
to decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable illness.""' Likewise,
the New Jersey court in In re Quinlan' gave direction to the balancing
in specified facilities. Id. This right to regulate the abortion procedure could be logically
extended to the hospice context. For example, it could be found that the state may regulate
procedures under which a person can legally refuse life-prolonging treatment; the state could
perhaps require that the patient make his decision to refuse treatment under the supervi-
sion of and consultation with his attending physician. In any case, state regulation of the
procedure need not conflict with.hospice practice and philosophy since hospice procedures
should be designed to promote patient autonomy while insuring the patient's safety and
these procedures could be altered to accommodate state regulation. See text accompanying
notes 171-74 infra.
'" This has been argued in state supreme courts. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp.
v. Heston, 58 N.J. at 582-83, 279 A.2d at 673.
" Standards, supra note 3, at 11.
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
... Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
142 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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between the state's interest and the patient's right of privacy by adding,
"the state's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims " '
Another state interest which may restrict a patient's decisionmaking
power is protecting the interests of innocent third parties. This state con-
cern generally arises in situations where the patient has young dependents
and the patient's illness is not terminal but instead could be readily cured
with the use of the medical treatment which the patient attempts to refuse.
In In re President of Georgetown College, Inc.,'" a mother of a seven month
old child tried to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds. The state
as parens patriae denied her right to refuse treatment in part because
her death would result in the abandonment of her child.14 However, the
state's interest in preserving the rights of innocent third parties is cur-
tailed if it can be shown that the concerned third parties will not be in-
jured by the patient's decision to refuse treatment. The court in In re
Estate ofBrooks4 6 noted that the patient's children were all of adult years
in concluding that the state's interests in compelling treatment did not
override the patient's religious principles.147 If the children are adults, they
are unlikely to be left without means of support upon the patient's death.
Many patients who enter hospices are middle-aged or elderly persons and
do not have minor children. The state would rarely have an interest in
protecting innocent third parties with regard to these hospice patients
who refuse extraordinary treatment. More significantly, even if a hospice
patient did have minor dependents, because he has a dim prognosis with
or without extraordinary treatment, the state's interest in protecting in-
nocent third parties would be slight. Treatment which could extend the
patient's life for only a few weeks or months would be unlikely to
significantly aid the third parties involved.
While a court may allow the patient to refuse treatment if no depen-
dent third parties will be injured, the patient will not be allowed to com-
mit suicide. The state's interest in preventing suicide has long been
recognized in the common law.'48 The traditional definition of suicide is
11 Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Saikewicz, Quinlan and In re Dinnerstein, 1978 Mass. App.
Ct. Adv. Sh.736, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978), all involved situations where a guardian decided
to refuse the treatment on behalf of the patient. Therefore, one could argue in these cases
that individual choice was not involved at all. Furthermore, Dinnerstein is an extension
of the Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions in that the court held a guardian need not obtain
a prior court order giving him the power to decide for the patient to stop the resuscitator.
If the decision cannot be made by the patient, it is to be made by the physician and family.
Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
1 Id. at 1008.
146 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
Id. at 372-73, 205 N.E.2d at 442. See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
"' John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. at 580, 279 A.2d at 672.
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"the intentional, voluntary, nonaccidental taking of one's own life." '149
Courts may determine whether there has been an act of suicide in a par-
ticular case by considering first, whether the individual intended to cause
his own death, and second, whether he initiated the act which led to his
death.' Technically, the refusal of life-prolonging treatment by a termi-
nally ill patient falls under this traditional definition, since the patient
recognizes that by refusing life-prolonging treatment his life could end
earlier than it would if the treatment were accepted. However, refusing
treatment when one is terminally ill should not be characterized as an
act of suicide. First, the terminally ill patient does not intend to cause
his own death. There is a distinction between recognizing that death is
inevitable and taking no action which will further prolong the suffering
accompanying one's illness and taking some independent action which, in
and of itself, initiates death."' A patient who refuses life-prolonging treat-
ment is allowing the inevitable, imminent event of death to proceed
naturally; he is not taking an independent action which results in death
where death would not have otherwise occurred."'
More importantly, the policies behind the state's interest in preventing
suicide do not apply to the case of the terminally ill hospice patient.'n
Aside from the state's interests in preserving life and protecting inno-
cent third parties discussed above, one could assert that the policies of
discouraging morally reprehensible acts and protecting persons from
themselves do not apply in cases where the patient is terminally ill. While
suicide has historically been considered morally reprehensible, T' the deci-
sion of a terminally ill patient to discontinue life-prolonging treatment is
recognized and condoned by many doctors'5 and even some religious
groups.' " In other words, the decision of a terminally ill patient is not
generally considered a reprehensible act of suicide. Moreover, a terminally
ill patient's decision to stop treatment is not a self-destructive decision
,' Note, Suicide and the Compulsion of Lifesaving Medical Procedures: An Analysis of the
Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 285, 295 (1978).Id. at 296.
However, the subjective intent of the patient in refusing treatment may not be con-
sidered determinative by the court. See John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
at 576, 279 A.2d at 670; In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1000.
15 One could also argue that refusing treatment is not an act-a taking of one's own life-
but merely an omission. However, this distinction is basically semantic. It may be argued
that a patient who recognizes that his life will probably end earlier if he refuses life-
prolonging treatment is making as much of a decision to shorten his life as one who know-
ingly injects himself with an overdose of drugs. Of course it could also be argued that the
patient did not initiate the act which led to his death since it was ultimately the illness
which killed him and he did not initiate the illness. However, one may rebut that, in fact,
it was the act of refusing treatment which ultimately resulted in his premature death.
153 See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE 314 (1957).
"u See Survey, supra note 13, at 1206.
" Rachels, supra note 27, at 78.
" Courier-J. (Louisville), Dec. 7, 1979, 5 A, at 3, col. 1; Courier-J. (Louisville), Oct. 27,
1979, S A, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4.
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made by a mentally disturbed individual. Even if one concedes that con-
siderations of protecting the suicidal person from himself are applicable
to cases of actual or attempted suicide under the assumption that one who
tries to kill himself may be regarded as maladjusted, depressed or men-
tally ill, such reasoning will not apply to the terminally ill hospice patient.
A terminally ill patient's decision to discontinue treatment is often
recognized as a reasoned, well-considered and even logical choice,"" not
one which is irrational or self-destructive such that he must be protected
from himself.1-M Finally, the decision of a terminally ill person to terminate
treatment cannot be construed as dangerous because it fails to strengthen
the will of others to live or because it tends to encourage others to
prematurely end their lives,"' since it involves a restricted situation. The
treatment may be foregone for many reasons -religious beliefs, a desire
not to prolong pain, the expense of the treatment, or an acceptance of
death 60 -but the overriding factor is that a cure is no longer possible;
in prolonging treatment the patient merely exacerbates physical, mental
and financial suffering. Because the patient's decision to terminate treat-
ment is based on the recognition that further treatment is gratuitous,
rather than on some independent desire to die, which is unrelated to his
terminal illness, his decision is distinct from a curable patient's decision
to terminate treatment and will not tend to encourage such conduct in
others.' Therefore, while a terminally fll patient's decision may arguably
fall under the traditional definition of suicide, this decision to terminate
treatment should not be characterized as an act of suicide since it does
not violate the policies which the state intends to promote in preventing
suicide and may be distinguished from cases which do fall within those
policies.
Finally, the state's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession has limited the patient's right to refuse treatment in
some cases. In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston,62 the court
considered the burden of the patient's refusal of treatment on the hospital
and physicians who are dedicated to preserving life. The court found that
See, e.g., notes 75-107 & accompanying text supra.
See generally Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1656.
' See also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 153, at 272.
'6 Informed Consent, supra note 29, at 1632.
,' Another policy against suicide is that a person wrongfully deprives society of his ex-
istence and activity. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 153, at 264 (1957). This policy also is not ap-
plicable to the context of a terminally ill patient refusing treatment because the course
of the patient's disease already deprives society of the patient's presence and activity. Prac-
tically or economically speaking, a patient dying of cancer within six months is of little benefit
to society; in fact, he is likely to be "unnecessarily" expending resources should he accept
expensive medical treatment which cannot cure him. In addition, while suicide may be emo-
tionally shocking and traumatic for certain members of society, such as the victim's im-
mediate family, id. at 271, death following the termination of life-prolonging treatment is
expected and may even evoke relief from grieving family members.
" 58 N.J. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
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if the patient is likely to die without treatment, then physicians may ad-
minister treatment and "pursue their functions according to their profes-
sional standards,""2 despite the patient's wishes. In United States v.
George," a man refused a blood transfusion, but asked to have an opera-
tion for his bleeding ulcer without the transfusion. The court said the doc-
tors could not be required to ignore the mandates of their own conscience:
"The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may not demand
mistreatment."'" In other words, a patient can choose to die at home, ig-
noring medical treatment altogether, but he cannot demand a treatment
which his doctor considers negligent.
Other courts have not permitted the state's interest in protecting the
medical profession's standards to override a patient's right of privacy to
refuse treatment. Instead, the right to refuse treatment is frequently con-
sidered to be consistent with conventional medical ethics. In Satz v.
Perlmutter,"65 the court stated:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand
that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circum-
stances .... Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment
in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores;
such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical
profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or
the State's interest in protecting the same. 16
The American Medical Association acknowledges that passive euthanasia
is permissible in some cases. 1 7 "The cessation of the employment of ex-
traordinary means to prolong the life of the body when there is irrefutable
evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient
and/or his immediate family." '68 When a physician can no longer cure a
patient, the most appropriate treatment may well be that which alleviates
pain and discomfort, rather than the continuation of curative therapy un-
til death. 69
In the case of a terminally ill hospice patient who requests that life-
prolonging treatment be terminated, some state supreme courts have held
16 239 F. Supp. 752 (D., Conn. 1965).
11, Id. at 754.
16 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
6 Id. at 163. The court added:
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that
there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no possi-
ble trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to do so
at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting
never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially
suspended, moment of death.
Id. at 164.
"8 Rachels, supra note 27, at 78.
" Id. (taken from a statement adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Medical
Association on Dec. 4, 1973).
169 See Standards, supra note 3, at 6.
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that the state's interests are outweighed by the patient's right of privacy
in deciding to refuse treatment. These interests include preserving life,
protecting the interests of innocent third parties, preventing suicide and
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.
RECOMMENDATIONS
While some state courts have concluded that a terminally ill patient's
right of privacy to refuse extraordinary treatment and receive palliative
care outweighs the state's interests in preserving life as long as possible,
and a few states have enacted natural death acts in an attempt to increase
patient autonomy and protect doctors from liability for complying with
a patient's wish to discontinue treatment, a hospice's legal position is-still
far from secure. However, hospices may take precautions in their admis-
sion and treatment procedures in order to reduce the risk of any poten-
tial legal liability.
First, before a patient is admitted into the hospice, the patient should
be certified by at least two physicians as being terminally ill. One of the
physicians certifying the patient should be the patient's attending physi-
cian since the attending physician is in the best position to evaluate the
progress of the patient's illness and his response, or lack thereof, to various
treatments previously administered. An outside physician's evaluation
would also be useful as an objective opinion but in any case the hospice
physician must also examine the incoming patient. If questions should later
arise regarding whether the patient was actually terminally ill upon his
admission to the hospice, the hospice physician might be charged with
negligence for not having verified that at the time of admission the pa-
tient's condition was still terminal and not in remission such that curative
therapy would have been appropriate. Certification should be in writing
and included in the patient's hospice records to avoid any evidentiary prob-
lems should questions later arise. This verification that the incoming
hospice patient is terminally ill should avoid successful claims later brought
against the hospice based on a theory that providing the patient with only
palliative treatment was negligent because he was not terminally ill at
the time of his admittance.
Second, the hospice should establish an ethics committee or some similar
mechanism which would interview and screen all prospective patients and
their families regarding the emotional and physical condition of each ap-
plicant in an effort to evaluate the likelihood that the patient will benefit
from hospice care. Not all patients can benefit from the hospice setting,
and not all families will feel comfortable with the unorthodox approach
to treatment practiced in a hospice.17
"I See id. at 7.
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Third, this committee must counsel the applicant and his family regard-
ing the procedures and implications of palliative treatment. For example,
it is possible that a hospice may have a standard practice of not utilizing
curative therapy for complications of the terminal illness, such as
pneumonia. The committee must disclose the procedures and implications
of and alternatives to palliative care in as much detail as possible so that
the patient and the family will know exactly what the palliative care in
that hospice will and will not entail. Such disclosure is required if the pa-
tient is to make an informed consent to hospice care. The hospice will only
be protected from an action claiming a lack of informed consent to the
treatment if it can document that it in fact made reasonable efforts to
explain all procedures, alternative procedures, and the implications of such
procedures to the patient, and in addition, received consent from the pa-
tient to hospice care after he had been so informed.
Fourth, each new patient should sign a directive modeled after those
outlined in the natural death acts, but altered in such a way that the in-
formed consent of the patient to palliative care is evident from the docu-
ment. The directive should include a section specifying that the patient
is aware he is terminally ill, that he desires a termination of all extra-
ordinary care, and further that the patient requests palliative care and
is fully aware of the consequences and limitations of such treatment.
Although hospices in ten of the jurisdictions which have passed natural
death acts are prohibited from making the execution of a directive a con-
dition precedent to receiving hospice care, each patient should be advised
of the purposes and procedures for executing a directive and encouraged
to execute one.
Finally, a regular procedure for review of the hospice standard of care
should be established. Like an acute care hospital, the hospice should
review all standards and procedures of clinical care17" ' to assure that all
appropriate efforts are made for each patient's comfort and well-being."2
One aspect of this review should be periodic examinations of each patient
to ascertain that the patient's condition is not in remission or in any other
state which would render palliative care inappropriate. Such periodic ex-
aminations should alleviate the possibility of an action being brought
against the hospice on the theory that the patient was properly admitted
to the hospice but later went into remission such that palliative care
71 Potter, supra note 2, at 54.
"' Legislatures may want to set up separate licensing requirements for hospices so that
they meet specific standards of care in order to be licensed. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
400.601-.615 (West Supp. 1981; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21401-.21421 (West Supp. 1981);
NEv. REV. STAT. SS 449.001-.240 (1979). Such statutory safeguards could be important for the
protection of patients since, as in nursing homes, the patients are in an extremely vulnerable
position with virtually no bargaining power.
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became inappropriate and the hospice was negligent for not transferring
the patient to a different facility for full curative therapy.
States which have enacted natural death acts should amend their acts
to specifically account for hospice care. The philosophy of hospice care
is the same as that reflected in the natural death acts"' and yet, as the
acts presently stand, they deny hospices many of the protections that are
afforded to them in states which have not enacted such statutes. If a state
determines that specific civil and criminal immunity is desirable for health
care providers who are willing to follow the direction of terminally ill pa-
tients who desire to discontinue treatment, then the statutes must be amend-
ed so that hospices may require a patient to execute a directive as a con-
dition to admission into the hospice. Furthermore, legislators should
carefully consider whether they, in fact, wish to deny minors, incompetents
and pregnant women the right to draft valid directives to refuse treat-
ment so that uncertainty is eliminated in this area."" Meanwhile, hospices
in states which presently deny such persons the right to draft valid direc-
tives'are at risk to accept such persons into their program of care.
CONCLUSION
Legal uncertainty and therefore the possibility of civil or criminal liabil-
ity faces the hospice movement. A legislative trend has developed in re-
cent years toward authorizing a patient's right to refuse treatment and
toward providing immunity from liability for doctors who choose to follow
the directive of their patients to discontinue life-prolonging treatment.
However, through oversight, this legislation has not specifically accounted
for the hospice situation, and therefore it provides more uncertainty than
protection for the legal position of the hospice.
In addition, while a few state supreme courts allow patients the choice
to discontinue extraordinary treatment pursuant to their right of privacy,
the majority of states have not yet found that a terminally ill patient has
a right of privacy to discontinue treatment. Therefore, hospices need to
take precautions in their admission and treatment procedures in order
to alleviate the possibility of successful lawsuits being brought against
them.
Moreover, each state legislature needs to consider whether to promote
i See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
174 One could propose that a separate statute be enacted for hospices, similar to the natural
death acts. While such a statute might add more protection for the hospice care providers,
it would probably inhibit flexibility by imposing restrictions on their methods of care, among
other things. Since hospice care emphasizes flexibility in that it develops a homelike at-
mosphere through, for example, unlimited visitation, the disadvantages of such a statute
would likely outweigh the benefits.
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patient autonomy and physician immunity through natural death acts, and
if so, whether to exclude specific persons such as pregnant women, minors
or mental incompetents from the class of patients who are granted such
patient autonomy. If a natural death act is approved by a state, it should
be written so that it protects the hospice movement since that movement
is directed toward just the sort of patient autonomy which the natural
death acts promote.
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